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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/REPRODUCTIVE 
JUSTICE—BREAKING THE TRAP: HOW WHOLE 
WOMAN’S HEALTH PROTECTS ABORTION ACCESS, AND THE 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE’S REBUKE OF ANTI-
ABORTION REGULATIONS 
Chelsea M. Donaldson 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due Process Clause is a 
powerful sword that protects certain rights and liberties.  Most of 
these non-fundamental rights are examined underneath the “rational 
basis” standard of constitutional review.  Despite being a right 
protected underneath the Substantive Due Process Clause, abortion 
stands alone in using a unique form of constitutional review: Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey’s “undue burden” standard. 
The striking down of Roe v. Wade’s trimester analysis, and the 
subsequent creation of the “undue burden” standard, resulted in a 
catastrophic tidal wave of targeted regulations against abortion 
providers (TRAP laws).  One such TRAP law, House Bill 2 (H.B. 2), 
was challenged.  The resulting lawsuit, Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt, declared that H.B. 2 was unconstitutional, using an 
analysis that diverged from standard abortion jurisprudence. 
This Note examines the Court’s history of Substantive Due Process 
jurisprudence, contrasting abortion with other non-fundamental 
rights and liberties.  It posits that the Substantive Due Process Clause 
not only should have been used all along to defend the constitutional 
right to access safe and legal abortion, but the Court’s latest 
examination of abortion in access provides a strengthened form of 
review to judge abortion restriction: “undue burden with ‘bite.’”  
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So long as this Court adheres to Roe v. Wade . . . and Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey . . ., 
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers laws like H.B. 2 
that ‘do little or nothing for health, but rather strew 
impediments to abortion,’ . . . cannot survive judicial 
inspection.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite being utilized since the beginning of ancient civilizations, 
abortion2 has always been different.3  A variety of ancient Greco-Roman 
texts mention the procedure,4 yet it is continually debated throughout the 
political sphere as to the legitimacy of the practice as a constitutional 
right.  It is a rare sight to go through a single political election without 
hearing about the future of Roe v. Wade or attempts to galvanize 
respective political bases utilizing reproductive justice as a tool for 
success or failure.5  Most political platforms have some sort of position 
on the nature of abortion or reproductive justice as a whole,6 and quite a 
few constituents vote with the politician’s position on abortion in mind.7  
 
1.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2321 (2016) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted). 
2.  “An artificially induced termination of a pregnancy for the purpose of destroying an 
embryo or fetus.”  Abortion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
3.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).  “Abortion is 
a unique act.  It is an act fraught with consequences for others . . . .”  Id. 
4.  It is impossible to peg down exactly where abortion began as a procedure, but there 
are a variety of mentions of the procedures held within ancient Greco-Roman texts—including 
Plato’s Theaetetus.  See TIMOTHY D. J. CHAPPELL, READING PLATO’S THEAETETUS 42–45 
(2005). 
5.  The rise of the “Tea Party” movement (a far-right section of the Republican Party) 
within the United States has led to a resurgence of anti-abortion policies across the country 
and has driven the Democratic Party to become more left-leaning in response.  See Neal 
Devins, Rethinking Judicial Minimalism: Abortion Politics, Party Polarization, and the 
Consequences of Returning the Constitution to Elected Government, 69 VAND. L. REV. 935, 
969–71 (2016) [hereinafter Judicial Minimalism].  This extreme resurgence of partisan politics 
left abortion in the dark as a protected constitutional right, as there was absolutely no middle 
ground to be found throughout the majority of both the Bush and Obama Administrations.  Id. 
6.  President Trump, in the third Presidential debate of the 2016 Election, declared 
abortion to be an act of murder: “If you go with what [Secretary Hillary Clinton] is saying, in 
the ninth month, you can take the baby and rip the baby out of the womb of the mother just 
prior to the birth of the baby.”  See Danielle Paquette, ‘Rip the Baby out of the Womb’: What 
Donald Trump Got Wrong About Abortion in America, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/20/rip-the-baby-out-of-the-womb-
what-donald-trump-got-wrong-about-abortion-in-america [https://perma.cc/Z7Z2-NKR9]. 
7.  For Americans, the feelings regarding abortion remain split—as they have for quite 
some time.  For an updated and expansive survey on how abortion affects voting choices and  
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It is unrealistic, then, to expect that this political divisiveness would not 
leak into the court system. 
The decision of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,8 combined with the 
newfound deference toward the state legislators in regard to abortion, 
has led to an alarming rate of anti-abortion regulations passing through 
state legislature.9  These targeted regulations of abortion providers 
(TRAP laws) are passed under the guise of protecting the health and 
safety of women, but in actuality do nothing except place a burden upon 
women who seek a safe and legal abortion.10 
Many factors contribute to these laws.  The political divisiveness of 
abortion, in addition to pseudoscience11 offered as legitimate medical 
fact, has caused the worst attack on abortion providers since before Roe 
v. Wade.12  Plenty of misinformation pervades the country concerning 
the practice of abortion; the problem is that much of this pseudoscience 
has leaked into the courts.13  This pseudoscience (ranging from the 
effectiveness of abortion medication to the near-constant debate of 
 
how Americans view abortion as a whole, see Abortion, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/
1576/abortion.aspx [https://perma.cc/U6PS-A5FL]. 
8.  See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
9.  See Michael A. Althouse, Note, The Creation of an Undue Burden: Arizona House 
Bill 2036 and State Abortion Regulations Post-Casey, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 173, 
178 (2013). 
10.  See id. at 181 (“While facially neutral, the laws have likely the intent, and often 
effect, of forcing medical facilities to stop providing abortions.”). 
11.  “A system of theories, assumptions, and methods erroneously regarded as 
scientific.”  Pseudoscience, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (11th ed. 2003).  While pseudoscience is not 
the core subject of this Note, its presence is seen numerous times within both Congress and 
the court system in order to justify restrictions of abortion.  For example, in October 2017, the 
Republican-controlled House of Representatives passed the Pain-Capable Unborn Child 
Protection Act, a federal ban on abortion after twenty weeks under the supposed knowledge 
that fetuses feel pain, despite the fact that, according to the American Congress of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), fetuses do not feel pain until well into the third 
trimester of pregnancy.  See Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, H.R. 36, 115th Cong. 
(2017) (as passed by H. Rep., Oct. 3, 2017) (a proposed bill to ban abortion after twenty 
weeks, utilizing pseudoscience as the basis of reasoning); cf. Am. Cong. of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, Facts Are Important: Fetal Pain, AM. CONG. OBSTETRICIANS & 
GYNECOLOGISTS (July 2013), https://www.acog.org/-/media/Departments/Government-
Relations-and-Outreach/FactAreImportFetalPain.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2MF-TX4M] (stating 
that “fetal pain” is an anti-abortion tactic and is scientifically proven to not exist until much 
later in the pregnancy). 
12.  See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972). 
13.  See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 932 (2000) (commenting upon the State’s 
failure to counteract established medical findings with a legitimate state interest); cf. Gonzales 
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 175–76 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referencing the inaccurate 
medical findings that Congress relied upon when passing the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act 
of 2003). 
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whether viability is a legitimate measure by which to judge termination 
limits) has led to the creation of many TRAP laws which (until very 
recently) were considered constitutional.14 
The emotional and difficult decision that is obtaining an abortion 
will not go undiscussed in this Note.  An abortion can provide life-
changing opportunities for a woman, or mean death for a woman who 
desperately requires medical assistance.15  But, too often, abortion 
providers or clinics are nearly impossible to find depending on what 
state the woman lives in.16  Attacks against abortion over the past forty 
years have dealt a significant blow to an essential medical procedure that 
is not only protected by the Constitution, but necessary to promote the 
health and wellbeing of women.17 
In contrast to other fundamental rights, abortion is constantly 
debated and forced to justify itself each election cycle.  This undermines 
a hard-fought right that, in truth, has yet to be properly won.  However, 
victories—though few—are well-earned.  One of those victories, Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,18 is the central topic of this Note.  This 
Note will argue that Whole Woman’s Health not only provides a stronger 
constitutional basis for protecting abortion access, but places abortion 
access within standard Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, thereby 
unifying the Substantive Due Process Clause and its approach to rational 
basis review. 
Part I of this Note will examine the historical underpinnings of the 
 
14.  Althouse, supra note 9, at 174.  For more information on the debate of 
pseudoscience in abortion, see Kelly Kasulis, #TheyFeelPain: Doctors Say the GOP’s Anti-
Abortion Campaign is Based on Pseudoscience, MIC (Oct. 4, 2017), https://mic.com/articles/
184990/theyfeelpain-doctors-say-the-gops-anti-abortion-campaign-is-based-on-pseudoscience 
[https://perma.cc/79HD-9A8W]. 
15.  Planned Parenthood (the largest abortion provider in the United States) has a 
helpful guide to determining whether an abortion is the right choice for you.  Within it, 
Planned Parenthood lists off multiple reasons why women obtain abortions, ranging from not 
being able to be a parent to not being physically able to carry the child to term.  See 
Considering Abortion, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/
abortion/considering-abortion [https://perma.cc/HL9L-F7WD]. 
16.  “Abortion clinics in the U.S. have closed at a record pace.  In five states—
Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota and Wyoming—just one remains.”  Esmé 
E. Deprez, U.S. Abortion Rights Fight, BLOOMBERG QUICKTAKE (updated July 7, 2016, 
10:18 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/abortion-and-the-decline-of-clinics. 
17.  Planned Parenthood estimates that out of the millions of unplanned pregnancies 
every year, four out of ten end in abortion.  Considering Abortion, supra note 15.  Overall, 
three out of ten women by the age of forty-five will have an abortion.  Id. 
18.  See generally Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
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Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.19  Part II 
of this Note will examine the history of abortion access within the 
United States, with a specific focus on the interpretation of the 
Substantive Due Process Clause and how it applies to different standards 
of scrutiny within the sphere of abortion.  Part III of this Note will then 
examine Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt20 in its entirety.  Part IV 
of this Note will argue that Whole Woman’s Health has taken a step 
away from Planned Parenthood v. Casey’s undue burden standard,21 and 
has instead implemented a heightened standard of review by which the 
court system can judge TRAP laws.  Finally, this Note will conclude that 
(1) Whole Woman’s Health’s “undue burden with teeth” standard 
provides more protection for abortion access than Casey, requiring a 
greater scrutiny of the relationship between a state’s legitimate interest 
and the burden placed upon a woman seeking an abortion; (2) Whole 
Woman’s Health is the new standard against which the court system 
must judge TRAP laws; and (3) that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due Process 
Clause bolsters Whole Woman’s Health into a more protective, less 
deferential test to protect abortion access. 
I. THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868,22 grouped with the 
other “Civil War” Amendments23 to the United States Constitution.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment acted as an order to the states; it required 
compliance with the Bill of Rights and added protections for former 
slaves, holding state actors accountable for constitutional violations.24  
 
19.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
20.  See generally Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. 2292. 
21.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992). 
22.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States, Article XIV (July 21, 1868), LIBRARY CONG., 
https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=015/llsl015.db&recNum=742 
[https://perma.cc/AM78-WZQM]. 
23.  The “Civil War” or “Reconstruction” Amendments are the colloquial terms for 
Amendments Thirteen through Fifteen of the United States Constitution.  See The Landmark 
Legislation: Thirteenth, Fourteenth, & Fifteenth Amendments, U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/CivilWarAmendments.htm 
[https://perma.cc/MVT7-CLFL].  They concern the abolishment of slavery, equal protection, 
due process, and the right to vote irrespective of race, respectively.  See U.S. CONST. amends. 
XIII–XV. 
24.  The notion that the Fourteenth Amendment forces the Bill of Rights upon the States 
is one that the Supreme Court has grappled with since the ratification of the Amendment.  See 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486–88 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).  Some  
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Located within the Fourteenth Amendment is the Due Process Clause, 
which prohibits states from denying a person their life, liberty, or 
property without due process of the law.25  Further, the Court has 
referenced that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
includes a “‘substantive’ component that protects certain liberty interests 
against state deprivation ‘no matter what process is provided.’”26  The 
differentiation between substantive due process and procedural due 
process was crafted with the understanding that some liberties and rights 
are “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental.”27  With this in mind, the Substantive Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a powerful tool 
to protect civil liberties, including abortion access.28 
As the United States moved into the Reconstruction Era, the Court 
was faced with the reality of a torn nation coming to terms with the 
aftermath of a brutal Civil War.29  A denial of liberty or property without 
due process of the law contradicts an essential cornerstone of American 
ideology.30  However, the Court had to face the stark reality of the state-
level constitutional violations in a rapidly emerging Jim Crow world, 
and what that meant for forging a new area of jurisprudence.31 
 
Supreme Court Justices have viewed the Fourteenth Amendment as embracing the Bill of 
Rights within its definition of “liberty;” others viewed it as a stand-alone Amendment.  Id. 
25.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”) (emphasis 
added). 
26.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2616 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). 
27.  Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
28.  The most recent achievements of the Substantive Due Process Clause can be found 
within Obergefell and the right to marry.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting).  While marriage has been considered a constitutionally protected right, the 
redefinition of marriage to include same-sex couples was considered, by some, to be 
revolutionary—and perhaps even unconstitutional in and of itself.  Id. 
29.  The Reconstruction Era refers to the period of time immediately following the Civil 
War.  See Edward L. Ayers, Reconstruction, GILDER LEHRMAN INST. AM. HIST., 
https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/reconstruction/essays/reconstruction (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2017).  The United States faced the end of slavery, the creation of new civil 
liberties, and the daunting prospect of unifying a once divided nation.  Id. 
30.  Within the twenty-seven Amendments to the United States Constitution, the denial 
of due process is referenced in two of them—the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, both 
which rule that a denial of due process by the Federal or State Government is unconstitutional.  
U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV. 
31.  The term “Jim Crow” refers to American de jure segregation.  See MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 
30–35 (rev. ed. 2012).  Despite the Union’s victory in the Civil War, Black Americans faced  
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As applied to abortion, constitutional standards of review have a 
complex history that will be discussed in Part II of this Note.  Initially, a 
discussion of constitutional standards of review as applied to the 
Substantive Due Process Clause is needed in order to fully understand 
the impact of Whole Woman’s Health upon abortion rights and 
Substantive Due Process jurisprudence. 
A. Standards of Constitutional Review 
The Supreme Court has two primary standards of review when 
examining substantive due process cases: strict scrutiny, for fundamental 
rights; and rational basis review, for those rights deemed non-
fundamental.32  Depending on which protected class or conduct the 
Court is examining in any given case, the standard of review may vary. 
Strict scrutiny is a skeptical standard of review, requiring that the 
legislation enacted be “narrowly tailored”33 to suit the state’s compelling 
interest by the least restrictive means possible.34  Strict scrutiny is the 
highest burden upon the state and is usually applied when the challenged 
legislation specifically targets classes of people based on race, national 
origin,35 or when a law infringes upon a fundamental right.36 
Rational basis is the least imposing standard of review, typically 
granting great deference to the legislature.37  The Court’s test for rational 
basis holds that “legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained 
 
further discrimination and violence underneath the State despite the constitutional protections 
enacted following the War.  Id. 
32.  “There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality 
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, 
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be 
embraced within the Fourteenth.”  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
33.  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301 (1993). 
34.  Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984). 
35.  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“It should be noted, to 
begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are 
immediately suspect.”).  Ultimately, Korematsu’s detention during the Second World War was 
deemed reasonably justified due to the wartime necessity of keeping track of potential enemy 
combatants, most of whom were of Japanese descent.  Id. at 219–24. 
36.  See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (“[L]egislation which restricts those 
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable 
legislation, [may] be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general 
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citations omitted). 
37.  “Unlike under heightened scrutiny, in a rational basis equal protection analysis 
courts look to any ‘conceivable basis’ for the challenged law, not limited to those articulated 
by or even consistent with the rationales offered by the legislature.”  Windsor v. United States, 
699 F.3d 169, 196 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
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if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.”38  The standard of review by which abortion 
was judged, before the advent of Whole Woman’s Health, is placed 
within this area of constitutional review, though the “undue burden” 
standard is not identical.39 
While rational basis review is, arguably, the least stringent of the 
three standards, the standard still requires a certain “nexus” of a logical 
conclusion between the regulation and the legitimate state interest at 
hand.40  Most rational basis standards compel state actors to provide at 
least some level of evidence beyond “compelling state interest” in order 
to pass a rational basis review of a specific act of legislation.41  The 
Lawrence Court did not find morality a compelling-enough state interest 
to warrant criminalizing sexual intimacy between same-sex partners by 
enacting an anti-sodomy statute, thereby resulting in a constitutional 
violation.42 
B. Is “Rational Basis” Rational? 
While the rational basis standard of review is the most deferential of 
the constitutional standards of review used by the Court, it has also taken 
on a new life of its own in recent Court decisions.43  The Substantive 
 
38.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (quoting City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)). 
39.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874–75 (1992).  The 
undue burden standard is exclusive to abortion jurisprudence and departs from traditional 
tiered standards of review utilized in other substantive due process jurisprudence.  See infra 
Part II (discussing the Casey doctrine and the evolution of abortion jurisprudence prior to 
Whole Woman’s Health); cf. infra Subpart I.B (exploring substantive due process 
jurisprudence with other fundamental rights, such as marriage and privacy within the home). 
40.  Emma Freeman, Note, Giving Casey Its Bite Back: The Role of Rational Basis 
Review in Undue Burden Analysis, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 279–80 (2013).  Despite 
this, the Court has remained exceedingly deferential to the legislature underneath rational 
basis review, even going so far as supplying hypothetical state interests in lieu of the 
purported failed interest.  See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 
487–88 (1955). 
41.  It should be noted that the standard utilized in Lawrence is what many scholars 
refer to as “rational basis with bite” or rational basis plus, as it held Texas to a greater 
standard than usually required under the Supreme Court’s past interpretations of the rational 
basis standard.  For a more in-depth analysis of “rational basis with bite,” see generally Gayle 
Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 
IND. L.J. 779 (1987). 
42.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (holding that anti-sodomy laws violated the 
Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
43.  See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2320 (2016) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (holding that Texas did not meet their burden 
when passing two TRAP laws that shut down over half of the abortion clinics within the  
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Due Process Clause cannot be swept aside every time a state has a 
rational basis for legislating against a protected class or right, but state 
legislatures must also be free to regulate when necessary.44  A middle 
ground must be met. 
The Court’s discretionary application of rational basis review has 
been discussed by countless legal scholars.45  However, the problem with 
rational basis review is exceptionally apparent in substantive due process 
cases.46  The Court has created a multitude of pathways to rational basis 
review, but has yet to define it into a unitary standard.47  While rational 
basis review is supposed to be the most deferential of standards, the 
Supreme Court uses it with much discretion and little cohesion.48 
Rational basis is the standard of review that was utilized to 
determine a violation of the Substantive Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment in a number of 
Supreme Court cases concerning sexual orientation49 and sexual 
 
state); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015) (striking down same-sex 
marriage bans as a violation of the Substantive Due Process Clause, as the states did not meet 
their burden); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (invalidating the 
Defense of Marriage Act as a violation of the Substantive Due Process Clause, as the 
legitimate government interest of the sanctity of marriage was not enough to meet the burden 
of proof). 
44.  The Tenth Amendment grants all powers to the States that are not specifically 
mentioned within the Constitution.  U.S. CONST. amend. X.  However, the Court, while stating 
that the Tenth Amendment does protect state sovereignty in some respects, has soundly 
refuted the notion that the Tenth Amendment trumps the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Hunter 
v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 232 (1985). 
45.  For a more nuanced discussion of standards of review and the argument against the 
Supreme Court’s discretionary application of rational basis review, see generally Suzanne B. 
Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004).  See also Judicial 
Minimalism, supra note 5 (prompting an examination of partisan politics and the Supreme 
Court’s weak approach to abortion jurisprudence). 
46.  See infra Sections I.B.1–3 (examining the history of the Substantive Due Process 
Clause); cf. infra Part II (examining the Casey doctrine and subsequent abortion 
jurisprudence). 
47.  See Goldberg, supra note 45, at 490 (“Yet, while the Court regularly explains its 
approach to rational basis review, it has not offered a theory for making collective sense of its 
variable lot of decisions.”). 
48.  Id. at 490–91. 
49.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015) (holding that bans against 
same-sex marriage violated both the Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) 
(holding that the discriminatory tax exemptions of the Defense of Marriage Act for 
heterosexual peoples violated both the Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (holding that 
the repeal of protective legislation for same-sex citizens violated the Equal Protection Clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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conduct.50  However, the Court’s application of the rational basis 
standard in each of the cases leaves much to be desired when used to 
protect certain rights and liberties, especially in terms of consistency.  
With extraordinary division amongst the members of the Court, the 
Supreme Court’s application of rational basis review, and the navigation 
of the Substantive Due Process Clause, tends to be far stricter than 
initially meets the eye—depending on what right the Court is examining. 
1. The Lochner Era 
Lochner v. New York launched a three-decades-long era of the Court 
participating in “judicial activism,” utilizing the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Substantive Due Process Clause to read a fundamental 
right to contract into the Constitution as a method of striking down labor 
laws to protect workers, as well as portions of President Roosevelt’s 
“New Deal” legislation to restore the economy from the disastrous 
effects of the Great Depression.51  The Lochner era is widely understood 
as a cautionary tale of what can happen when the Supreme Court does 
not adequately defer to the legislature, at least with respect to economic 
legislation and decisions.52  For better or for worse, it has also shaped 
Substantive Due Process jurisprudence for the past one hundred years.53 
Lochner struck down a New York statute meant to protect bakery 
workers from unsafe working conditions,54 citing “freedom of contract” 
between employer and employee as a fundamental right protected by the 
Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.55  While 
the freedom to form a contract was not a newly created right at the time 
of Lochner,56 the Supreme Court’s intervention with the legislature 
created a very real problem with the public’s perception of the purpose 
 
50.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (holding that anti-sodomy 
laws violated the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
51.  The Lochner decision has often been hailed as an example of “judicial activism” 
and is frequently cited by the Court as a warning to err on the side of legislative deference.  
See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987). 
52.  Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional 
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 1 (1991) (“Legal scholars and historians have generally depicted 
the Lochner era as a deviant period during which the Supreme Court broke from the 
constitutionalism that the Marshall Court established and the New Deal Court restored.”). 
53.  See id. at 6–7. 
54.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). 
55.  Id. at 53; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
56.  See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 587–88 (1897) (striking down a Louisiana 
statute on the grounds of violating a person’s free right to contract underneath the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
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of the Court: when is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to impose its 
own theories upon the legislature and, by correlation, the people?57 
Since its founding, the Court’s role has been to interpret the 
Constitution, not to be involved in the executive or legislative branches 
of government.58  When the Court acts as a “super-legislature,” it 
undermines the power of the legislature itself.59  Since Lochner, the 
Court has attempted to stay the course in terms of legislative deference 
and wield a rational basis standard in order to determine whether or not 
the legislature has overstepped its boundaries.60  Unfortunately, the 
judiciary does not do so with an even hand—particularly in the area of 
law known as reproductive justice.61  Despite an attempt to solidify the 
approach to the doctrine with a narrowed scope of review for lower 
courts to utilize, the judiciary has made a muddied history of the 
Substantive Due Process Clause ever since.62  As this Note discusses, the 
Supreme Court’s almost reactionary aversion to becoming a “super-
legislative” body has caused a rift in reproductive justice jurisprudence, 
particularly in the realm of abortion. 
 
57.  Justice Holmes’ dissent within Lochner warns of the Supreme Court imposing their 
opinions regarding economics onto a legislature that clearly felt otherwise.  See Lochner, 198 
U.S. at 74–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
58.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). 
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to 
enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they 
have a discretion.  Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the 
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court. 
Id. 
59.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). 
60.  See Malmed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565, 575–76 (3d Cir. 1980).  Further, the 
Supreme Court has since shelved the discussion of economics into the realm of the political 
question doctrine: matters of how to run the government have been left to the politicians—not 
the Supreme Court.  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–12 (1962) (offering a variety of 
governmental actions that the Supreme Court will not delve into, including Native American 
sovereignty and foreign relations).  On the other hand, instances of government infraction that 
tread into constitutional matters are within the Court’s purview.  Id. 
61.  Despite the fact that abortion is now considered a protected right underneath the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it did not start that way.  Reproductive justice jurisprudence began 
with Griswold v. Connecticut, where the right to privacy was found within the first 
Amendment—not the Fourteenth.  See Griswold, 381 U.S at 484–85. 
62.  “As with any aspect of substantive due process, a court using the irrebuttable 
presumption doctrine must apply the rational basis test, or in appropriate cases, strict scrutiny.  
Otherwise, the courts would be resorting to blatant ‘Lochnerism,’ a concept that has been 
administered suitable last rites and mercifully interred.”  Malmed, 621 F.2d at 575–76 (citation 
omitted). 
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2. Contraception: The Rejection of Lochner and the Establishment 
of Privacy 
In 1965, the Supreme Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut, a case 
that established the fundamental right to contraception and privacy 
within the home.63  The Griswold Court, in analyzing a challenge to 
Connecticut’s then anti-contraception statute that penalized both medical 
professionals and married couples alike, circumnavigated the resurgence 
of Lochner by plainly stating that Lochner did not guide their decision-
making.64  An interest in the sanctity of the marital bedroom and the 
“penumbras of rights” encompassed by the Bill of Rights65 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment66 drove the Court to strike down the anti-
contraception law, expanding the definition of “fundamental rights” to 
include the right to privacy in deciding whether to bear or beget a 
child.67 
Griswold opened the door for both abortion access and the 
convolution of abortion access jurisprudence.  While Griswold had the 
opportunity to strike down the Connecticut statute utilizing the 
Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court chose instead to utilize established First Amendment 
jurisprudence—an equally important amendment to the Constitution, but 
one that provides shaky-at-best protection.68  Justice Harlan, in his 
concurrence, warns against the Court’s insistence on utilizing a 
“penumbra of rights” rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, stating that 
“[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my 
opinion, on its own bottom.”69  By not incorporating the right to privacy 
and the right to marital contraception within the Substantive Due Process 
Clause out of fear of “Lochnerizing,” Justice Harlan argues that the 
Court has unwittingly imposed “an artificial and largely illusory 
restriction on the content of the Due Process Clause.”70  
 
63.  See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86. 
64.  Id. at 481–82. 
65.  The majority of Griswold made the determination that the First Amendment, held 
within a penumbra of rights, established the right to privacy, thereby striking down the 
Connecticut statute.  See id. at 484–85. 
66.  Justice Goldberg’s concurrence provides a compelling argument that the concept of 
“liberty” held within the Fourteenth Amendment protects such fundamental rights alone, 
without absorbing the Bill of Rights.  See id. at 486–88 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
67.  Id. at 485–86. 
68.  See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
69.  Id. 
70.  See id. at 502 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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The Court’s convoluted jurisprudence regarding contraception 
continued with Eisenstadt v. Baird, which expanded the holding of 
Griswold to include the right of contraception to unmarried couples.71  
Again, Eisenstadt does not rely on the Substantive Due Process Clause 
to determine that Massachusetts violated the Constitution; instead, 
Eisenstadt grants unmarried couples the right to utilize contraception by 
means of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.72 
In later jurisprudence, the Court pointed out the close relationship 
between the Substantive Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.73  In Eisenstadt, the clear divide 
between two separate classes of people—married and unmarried—made 
the determination of which clause to use relatively simple, when the 
Court determined to apply the Equal Protection Clause.74  However, the 
continued avoidance of utilizing the Substantive Due Process Clause out 
of fear of judicial activism has created a divide within the Court’s 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.75  For some fundamental rights, 
the Substantive Due Process Clause will gladly do most of the work, 
(and will sometimes do so hand-in-hand with the Equal Protection 
Clause).76  For others—namely, reproductive justice, and more 
specifically, abortion—the standard is lessened and not granted the same 
weight of constitutional authority.77 
3. Romer vs. Lawrence: Equal Protection vs. Substantive Due 
Process 
The aversion of the Supreme Court to utilize the Substantive Due 
Process Clause within the realm of reproductive justice is highlighted 
when examining other areas of the law that the Due Process Clause 
encompasses, such as private, adult, consensual sexual conduct.78  In 
 
71.  See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443, 446–47 (1972). 
72.  See id. at 446–47. 
73.  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015). 
74.  See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443. 
75.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (striking down same-sex marriage bans, and 
rejecting the state’s historical “sanctity of marriage” argument); cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (overturning Roe’s strict scrutiny standard in favor of 
the “undue burden” standard, a lessened form of rational basis review). 
76.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–03. 
77.  The standard by which abortion is judged was originally a strict scrutiny standard, 
protected underneath Roe v. Wade.  See 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973).  It was lessened in 
1992, with the decision in Casey and the invention of the “undue burden” standard.  See 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 874. 
78.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down an anti- 
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Lawrence v. Texas, the Court examined the prosecution of a gay man, 
John Geddes Lawrence, for engaging in sodomy within the privacy of 
his home.79  He was arrested for this act.80  On appeal, the Court struck 
down the anti-sodomy statute Lawrence was prosecuted under, citing the 
Substantive Due Process Clause as the protective piece of constitutional 
law that Texas violated.81 
Interestingly, the majority in Lawrence utilized both Griswold and 
Eistenstadt82 as the foundation for establishing a right to privacy in one’s 
home, even though neither of those cases utilizes the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.83  Justice Kennedy rejected the 
argument that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
should take paramount importance when examining the Texan statute.84  
Instead, Justice Kennedy chose to invalidate the statute under the 
Substantive Due Process Clause to eradicate any opportunity for states to 
re-draw statutes to allow for equal opportunity discrimination between 
homosexual and heterosexual couples alike.85  This lack of deference to 
the legislature, even when there is a purported state interest, has 
commonly been labeled as “rational basis with bite.”86  In Lawrence, the 
Court not only soundly rejected Texas’s state interest, but invalidated it 
completely under the Substantive Due Process Clause without the 
possibility of an alternate theory.87 
To make matters even more complicated, Justice Kennedy cited the 
Founding Fathers’ inability to “know[] the components of liberty in its 
manifold possibilities” of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due 
Process Clauses when striking down the Texan anti-sodomy statute.88  
 
sodomy statute as a violation of the Substantive Due Process Clause).  In a prior case, the 
Court utilized the Equal Protection Clause as the basis for protection.  See Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996).  
79.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562–63. 
80.  Id. at 563. 
81.  See id. at 578–79. 
82.  See id. at 564–65. 
83.  Justice Kennedy also made copious references to Roe v. Wade and Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, both of which rely on the Substantive Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. at 565–74; see also infra Part II. 
84.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574–75, 578. 
85.  Id. 
86.  See id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the Court has “applied a more 
searching form of rational basis review” when the legislature treads into personal 
relationships). 
87.  See id. at 578–79. 
88.  Id. at 578. 
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Indeed, Justice Kennedy views the future as a wealth of possibilities in 
examining the Substantive Due Process Clause, the potential of 
fundamental rights expanding into the future as society’s awareness of 
fundamental rights develops.89  This limitless area of possibilities stands 
for the notion that the area of fundamental rights is constantly evolving 
and argues for a more expansive approach to the Substantive Due 
Process Clause, rather than a restrictive one.90 
The decision to utilize the Substantive Due Process Clause in lieu of 
the Equal Protection Clause is another confusing choice, as seven years 
prior, Justice Kennedy struck down a targeted repeal of anti-
discrimination protections against LGBTQ91 citizens primarily under the 
Equal Protection Clause.92  In Romer v. Evans, Colorado amended its 
constitution “in . . . a state-wide referendum.”93  The amendment 
(Amendment 2) repealed ordinances across Colorado “to the extent they 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of ‘homosexual . . . orientation, 
conduct, practices, or relationships.’”94  The Colorado Supreme Court 
struck down Amendment 2 by subjecting it to strict scrutiny, citing the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.95  The Supreme 
Court affirmed, but under a different rationale96: Amendment 2 violated 
the Constitution, but the Court applied a rational basis standard of review 
rather than strict scrutiny.97 
The dissenting opinions of both Romer and Lawrence cite similar 
criticisms—specifically that the Court’s majority is forcing its respective 
opinions onto the people.98  In Lawrence, the focus on “judicially 
 
89.  “[The Founding Fathers] knew that times can blind us to certain truths and later 
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.  
As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own 
search for greater freedom.”  Id. at 579. 
90.  See id. 
91.  LGBTQ is a common acronym that stands for “lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, 
queer.”  Glossary of Terms, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/
glossary-of-terms [https://perma.cc/9D2P-JJG4].  It is an umbrella term to generally 
encompass the queer community.  See id. 
92.  See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624, 635 (1996). 
93.  Id. at 623. 
94.  Id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST., Art. II, § 30b (1993). 
95.  Romer, 517 U.S. at 625. 
96.  Id. at 626. 
97.  See id. at 631–32 (“[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a 
suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation 
to some legitimate end.”). 
98.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 587–88 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see 
also Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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invented . . . rights”99 and the criticism of expanding further into 
Lochner-esque territory weighed on the minds of the dissenting authors 
who accused the majority of protecting some controversial opinions 
(namely, abortion rights) and striking down others (here, anti-sodomy 
laws).100  For Justice Scalia, the notion of placing homosexuality on the 
same level of scrutiny as race or religion was something to be left to the 
legislatures and the people, not to the Supreme Court of the United 
States.101  Both Lawrence and Romer, ultimately, granted protections to 
LGBTQ citizens by extending a rational basis standard in the face of a 
newly created protected class; but the reliance (or lack thereof) upon the 
Substantive Due Process Clause further complicates the jurisprudence on 
which abortion access, as will be discussed in Part II, relies.102 
4. Sexual Orientation: Obergefell and the Expansion of 
Substantive Due Process 
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court rejected the States’ 
arguments for same-sex marriage bans, concluding that the historical 
nuances of marriage being solely between one man and one woman was 
not a legitimate state interest in the face of the discrimination imposed 
upon LGBTQ couples seeking marriage rights.103  Additionally, Justice 
Kennedy stated that the Fourteenth Amendment’s “liberties extend to 
certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy.”104  
This groups Obergefell’s central holding—the constitutional right to 
marriage, regardless of sexual orientation—with other non-fundamental 
rights, such as obtaining birth control.105  Even further, the declaration of 
same-sex marriage as a constitutionally protected activity was done by 
utilizing the rational basis standard: weighing the state’s legitimate 
interest in protecting the sanctity of marriage against Jim Obergefell’s 
 
99.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
100.  See id. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
101.  Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
102.  See Amelia Craig Cramer, The Freedom to Marry Must Not Be Denied, ARIZ. 
ATT’Y 14, 18–19 (Mar. 2004), https://www.myazbar.org/AZAttorney/PDF_Articles/
0304SameSexPRO.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU8R-BBT6] (citing Lawrence and Romer as an 
expansion of civil protections for LGBTQ couples and a rejection of bias as a legitimate state 
interest). 
103.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015) (granting same-sex 
couples the right to marry while refuting the historical “one man and one woman” argument 
the States provide as a legitimate interest). 
104.  Id. at 2597. 
105.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965). 
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right to have his marriage validated by the state of Ohio.106 
Interestingly, Obergefell utilizes both the Equal Protection Clause 
and the Substantive Due Process Clause in harmony to strike down 
numerous same-sex marriage bans.107  Again, as with the sexual 
intimacy cases, Obergefell cited the contraception cases Griswold and 
Eisenstadt in order to define the concept of liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause (in addition to most of the rights held within the Bill of 
Rights) as “personal choices central to individual dignity and 
autonomy,” when neither case utilized the Due Process Clause directly 
in their determination of reproductive justice as a fundamental right.108  
And, again, Justice Kennedy remarked upon the potential of the future, 
defining fundamental rights by reminding states that the very definition 
of “rights” must be malleable.109 
The dissenting opinions in Obergefell call attention to the Court’s 
arguably Lochner-esque approach to the Substantive Due Process 
Clause.110  The dissents accuse the majority of applying their own vision 
of what a fundamental right is,111 arguing that this supplants rational 
basis review by simply declaring what the law should be, rather than 
what the law is.112  Justice Scalia’s dissent argues that the majority 
overstepped its boundaries into the legislative branch, overturning gay 
marriage bans because they interpreted the right to same-sex marriage as 
one protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.113  The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Substantive Due Process Clause has, after Obergefell, 
molded rational basis into a standard that can, in conjunction with the 
Equal Protection Clause, encompass groups of people that have been 
stigmatized or targeted, regardless of the historical or legislative 
 
106.  The state interest in preserving the “sanctity of marriage” is an argument that the 
Court rejected in Obergefell, citing a long history of expanding constitutional rights to groups 
that were previously unable to access them due to historical bias or prejudice at the time.  
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (“If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then 
received practices could serve as their own continued justification and new groups could not 
invoke rights once denied.”). 
107.  See id. at 2602–04 (exploring the connection of the Substantive Due Process 
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, particularly in regard to marriage jurisprudence). 
108.  Id. at 2597–98. 
109.  Id. at 2602. 
110.  See id. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  “[T]he majority’s approach has no 
basis in principle or tradition, except for the un-principled tradition of judicial policymaking 
that characterized discredited decisions such as Lochner v. New York.”  Id. 
111.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court today not 
only overlooks our country’s entire history and tradition but actively repudiates it . . . .”). 
112.  Id. at 2611. 
113.  See id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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reasoning that states have relied on for hundreds of years.114 
5. Judicial Activism and Fundamental Rights: Rational Basis 
Review Resolved? 
The notion of judicial activism is pervasive in many dissenting 
opinions surrounding the Substantive Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  This only bolsters the argument that the 
Supreme Court’s method in approaching the Substantive Due Process 
Clause—especially when rational basis scrutiny is involved—seems to 
be a “flavor of the day” approach.115  The Court’s selective usage of the 
Substantive Due Process Clause is not a novel legal conclusion—if 
anything, it is a frequently discussed and debated one.116  That said, 
rational basis review and the determination of what constitutes a 
fundamental right holds significant strength in determining whether or 
not a state has overstepped its boundaries in regard to a deprivation of 
life, liberty, or property.117  In addition, the Court has combined the 
Equal Protection Clause, the Substantive Due Process Clause, and their 
respective tests in recent jurisprudence, leading to even more 
confusion—and debate—on which test and which clause meets which 
standard.118  Thus, the standard of review is rational basis when 
determining whether the person’s conduct is protected by the states’ 
intrusion; it is then simply a question of whether or not the Court deems 
that specific right, as applied, worth protecting.119  
 
114.  See id. at 2629–30 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
115.  See supra Sections I.B.1–4. 
116.  For a more nuanced discussion on the fallout of judicial activism and Lochner, see 
Sunstein, supra note 51.  See generally Goldberg, supra note 45 (arguing for a single-tiered 
approach to the Equal Protection Clause, rather than the multi-tiered, flawed approach that the 
Court currently utilizes). 
117.  See Malmed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565, 575–77 (3d Cir. 1980). 
118.  See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640 n.1 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  “The 
Court evidently agrees that ‘rational basis’—the normal test for compliance with the Equal 
Protection Clause—is the governing standard.”  Id.; cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2602–03 (2015).  “The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a 
profound way, though they set forth independent principles.”  Id.  “Each concept—liberty and 
equal protection—leads to a stronger understanding of the other.”  Id. at 2603. 
119.  There is a great divide among multiple Court benches on the issue of whether the 
right to seek an abortion should be protected by the Constitution.  See Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 981–82 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172–73 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  This is 
not a settled issue by any means; the dissents of Whole Woman’s Health are rife with 
suggestions to overturn Roe v. Wade.  See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. 
Ct. 2292, 2324 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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So what, exactly, is a right worth protecting?  Fundamental rights, 
outside of the legal context, seem to be easily defined by the layman, but 
even legal scholars and wordsmiths shroud the definition in vague and 
confusing language.120  It is easy to be thrilled when the Court makes a 
determination that you feel benefits your specific cause of action,121 but 
an examination of the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence (a 
willingness to err on the side of the legislature for some fundamental 
rights over others) leaves much room for a revocation of the same rights 
the Court had eagerly defended just the case before.122  It is this lack of 
consistency—combined with the political vagaries of constituting a 
majority—that created the Casey predicament with abortion.  
Specifically, how can something be a fundamental right when the Court 
is so deferential to the legislature in restricting access to said 
fundamental right?123 
Ultimately, the Court’s heavy hand when examining the Substantive 
Due Process Clause seems to hinge on what the Court believes to be a 
fundamental right and whether the State has offered a compelling 
enough reason to infringe upon it.124  The Court’s fear of appearing 
Lochner-esque and allowing the legislature a large amount of deference 
has proven dangerous in the past—Dred Scott125 is not ancient history.  
 
120.  Fundamental right, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014). 
A significant component of liberty, encroachments of which are rigorously tested 
by courts to ascertain the soundness of purported governmental justifications.  A 
fundamental right triggers strict scrutiny to determine whether the law violates the 
Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.  As 
enunciated by the Supreme Court, fundamental rights include voting, interstate 
travel, and various aspects of privacy (such as marriage and contraception rights). 
Id. (emphasis added). 
121.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Celebrate the 
achievement of a desired goal.  Celebrate the opportunity for a new expression of commitment 
to a partner.  Celebrate the availability of new benefits.  But do not celebrate the Constitution.  
It had nothing to do with it.”). 
122.  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (striking down abortion bans as unconstitutional 
underneath the Substantive Due Process Clause); cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (striking down 
Roe’s standard of review to replace it with a more legislature-friendly “undue burden” 
standard). 
123.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874. 
124.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2615–16 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (exploring the 
notion that the Court upended the power from the legislature and utilized the Substantive Due 
Process Clause to expand the definition of marriage to include same-sex couples with no legal 
basis). 
125.  See Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406 (1857) (declaring Dred Scott, a 
Black man, not a citizen of the United States and therefore incapable of suing for his or his 
family’s freedom in court), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
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But for the protection of abortion access, the muddiness of the rational 
basis standard and the Supreme Court’s willingness to curtail certain 
fundamental freedoms while expanding others has done more harm than 
good.126 
II. THE BEGINNINGS OF ABORTION ACCESS 
Abortion access is considered a fundamental right under the United 
States Constitution.127  Despite this, abortion remains a divisive issue 
among the American public.  The political atmosphere that often 
surrounds the procedure of abortion cannot, and will not, be ignored in 
this Note.  Abortion is a crux within each election cycle that is frequently 
debated and argued as a fundamental right that should or should not 
exist.128  The jurisprudence surrounding abortion is equally controversial 
and dramatic, due to frequent rehashing by legal scholars upon each 
dispositive abortion-related Supreme Court decision.129  Whole Woman’s 
Health is no exception.130 
This Note examines the history of abortion access with the purpose 
of extracting the legal language surrounding the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Substantive Due Process Clause in order to parse through 
the standard of review utilized in the Court’s most recent decision to 
protect abortion access in Texas.131  Before that discussion can take 
place, however, this Note must discuss a prior Texas abortion case first: 
Roe v. Wade.132 
A. Roe v. Wade and Strict Scrutiny 
In 1973, the Supreme Court decriminalized abortion in the seminal 
 
126.  See infra Part II. 
127.  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. 
128.  See supra Introduction. 
129.  The conversation surrounding Casey, the Supreme Court case upon which the 
“undue burden” standard emerged, continues to develop, even after twenty years.  See 
Freeman, supra note 40.  See generally R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey Abortion Rights Law: Strict Scrutiny for Substantial Obstacles on 
Abortion Choice and Otherwise Reasonableness Balancing, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 75 
(2015). 
130.  See Scott Skinner-Thompson et al., Marriage, Abortion, and Coming Out, 116 
COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 126, 138–42 (2016); see also Elizabeth Price Foley, Whole 
Woman’s Health and the Supreme Court’s Kaleidoscopic Review of Constitutional Rights, 
2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 153, 169–75 (2016). 
131.  See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2320 (2016); see also 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
132.  See generally Roe, 410 U.S. 113. 
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case, Roe v. Wade.133  In decriminalizing abortion, the Court examined 
the standard of review to be utilized in assessing the power of the State 
in regulating the procedure.134  While the Court declared a ban on 
abortion as a violation of the Substantive Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,135 the Court also determined that a state had a 
legitimate interest “in protecting the potentiality of human life” after the 
first trimester.136  By declaring that states have some power to regulate 
abortion, the Court crafted a standard of review by which to evaluate 
states’ legislative attempts to restrict both the practice of and access to 
abortion procedures.137  Per the decision in Roe, a state’s ability to 
restrict a woman’s right to an abortion became more suspect the less 
viable the fetus was, and more tolerable the farther along a woman’s 
pregnancy progressed,138 because a state had a legitimate interest in both 
women’s health and protecting the potentiality of life.139  Miraculously, 
the Court handed down a strict scrutiny standard to protect abortion 
access in a time where the prospects of seeking a legal abortion in some 
areas of the country was practically impossible.140 
This strict scrutiny standard was an exemplary depiction of the art 
of compromise.  Abortion was protected by the Substantive Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but a state was also able to 
regulate within a (relatively) bright line rule of law that the Court 
enacted.141  Toeing the line of the Roe standard involved forcing a state 
to make a compelling argument for protecting both the safety of women 
and fetal welfare, and to provide a cut-off point where the states could 
not regulate.142  In other words, there was no carte blanche handed to 
 
133.  See id. at 164 (“A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that 
excepts from criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard 
to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (emphasis removed). 
134.  See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992). 
135.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  “No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”  Id. (emphasis 
added). 
136.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. 
137.  See id. at 162–63. 
138.  Id. at 163. 
139.  Id. at 162. 
140.  See David A. Grimes, The Bad Old Days: Abortion in America Before Roe v. 
Wade, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Jan. 15, 2015, 12:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
david-a-grimes/the-bad-old-days-abortion_b_6324610.html [https://perma.cc/WWA6-NEPZ]. 
141.  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162–63. 
142.  This standard was overturned with the Casey Court, who believed that Roe’s  
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legislators when it came to abortion-related regulations.143  During the 
first trimester (or pre-viability), the state must take a step back because 
strict scrutiny applies.144  After the first trimester (or post-viability), the 
courts are willing to be more lenient with the legislatures’ attempts at 
regulating or restricting abortion access, and rational basis review 
became the acceptable standard of review.145 
Though the Roe Court utilized both Griswold and Eisenstadt to 
establish the right to privacy and personal autonomy,146 Justice 
Blackmun cites more often than not to the concurring opinions in 
Griswold, which warned of the devaluation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment if it were placed second to the “penumbra of rights” 
doctrine that was utilized by the majority.147  However, Justice Stewart’s 
concurring opinion in Roe states what the concurring opinions of 
Griswold had stated all along, that Griswold is an exercise of the 
Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
should remain as such.148 
While Roe provides a solid beginning for abortion as a fundamental 
right with a bright-line rule on when a state could regulate the procedure, 
it rests on shaky foundation.149  In direct contrast to Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence (both before Roe and after), Roe’s abortion 
protection is akin to a stone house standing on wooden stilts: it was built 
 
bright line rule ran contrary to its own logic.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (“Before viability, Roe and subsequent cases treat all governmental 
attempts to influence a woman’s decision on behalf of the potential life within her as 
unwarranted.  This treatment is, in our judgment, incompatible with the recognition that there 
is a substantial state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy.”). 
143.  With Casey’s looser standard (and Roe’s overturn in part) came greater freedom 
for legislatures to enact TRAP laws.  See Nina Martin, The Supreme Court Case That Made a 
Mess of Abortion Rights, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 29, 2016, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/02/supreme-court-decision-mess-abortion-rights 
[https://perma.cc/M8VL-MRJQ] (“After Roe established abortion rights, Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey reined them in, creating a new legal standard that gave states greater leeway to 
regulate the procedure.”). 
144.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876. 
145.  See id. at 870. 
146.  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 129. 
147.  See id. at 219. 
148.  Id. at 167–68 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
149.  While Roe utilizes the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in protecting abortion access, it relies upon the contraception cases for legal 
standing, which utilize the “penumbra of rights” doctrine held within the First Amendment.  
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443, 456–57 (1972); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965) (White, J., concurring). 
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with the best of intentions, but the foundation was not meant to last.150  
The Court’s reluctance to grant the full protection of the Substantive Due 
Process Clause to reproductive justice with contraception provides a 
muddied and murky pathway of legal logic, particularly when you 
compare Roe to other areas of protection.151  Placing abortion (during the 
first trimester) in the same protective categories as other fundamental 
rights had the best of intentions, but challenges began to rise almost 
immediately to protest the Court’s presumed super-legislative exercise of 
power in creating a space for abortion in the hall of fundamental rights 
and liberties protected under the Constitution.152 
B. Planned Parenthood v. Casey and the Deconstruction of Strict 
Scrutiny 
Immediately following Roe, as states could no longer ban abortion, 
a number of measures were enacted across the country in order to restrict 
access rather than ban the procedure outright.153  Due to this constant 
testing of the Roe standard, the stage was set for another discussion on 
how far a state could go in terms of regulating abortion access—
particularly in the face of such a polarized nation that could not seem to 
agree on how it felt about abortion.154  Ultimately, the Court determined 
Roe stretched too far, and the abortion access movement was dealt a 
harsh blow in 1992 with the holding of Planned Parenthood v. Casey.155 
Casey examined the constitutionality of five Pennsylvania statutory 
provisions: (1) a woman must be given informed consent of the abortion 
procedure; (2) said informed consent must be provided to the woman 
seeking an abortion twenty-four hours before the procedure is 
performed; (3) a minor must obtain consent from her parents in order to 
have an abortion, though the statute provides a judicial option if consent 
 
150.  As this Note discusses, the recent interpretation of the Casey standard in Whole 
Woman’s Health cements abortion access within standard Substantive Due Process 
jurisprudence, casting aside the “penumbra of rights” doctrine and using much stronger legal 
language.  See infra Part IV; see also supra Part II. 
151.  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 172–73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
152.  See id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (comparing the majority opinion of Roe 
to Justice Peckham’s majority opinion in Lochner). 
153.  See Targeted Regulations of Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INST., 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/targeted-regulation-abortion-providers 
[https://perma.cc/H2FM-6WWM] (last updated May 1, 2018). 
154.  See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When 
“Protecting Health” Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1436 (2016) [hereinafter Clinic 
Closings]. 
155.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873–74 (1992). 
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cannot be obtained; (4) a married woman must obtain consent from her 
spouse before obtaining an abortion; and (5) abortion clinics must 
comply with reporting requirements enacted by the state on all of the 
provisions listed above.156 
However, instead of applying the strict scrutiny standard created in 
Roe, the Court struck down the trimester approach157 and replaced the 
strict scrutiny standard with a new, undefined standard: the “undue 
burden” standard.158  The “undue burden” standard, facially, is simple: a 
state is free to regulate abortion so long as it does not pose an “undue 
burden” upon a woman’s right to seek an abortion.159  In application, 
however, the Casey holding cast the country into the very “jurisprudence 
of doubt” that Justice O’Connor warned so strongly against in her 
majority opinion.160 
The “undue burden” standard is one that has been difficult to peg 
down, in that it does not necessarily fit within any neat box of 
constitutional review.  It has been labeled by legal scholars as something 
resembling a stronger rational basis standard, but that labeling has been 
struck down by Supreme Court Justices currently presiding from the 
bench.161  Indeed, “undue burden” is an abortion-specific standard of 
review that is not utilized in any other examination of other named 
fundamental rights.162  Regardless of what you label the “undue burden” 
standard (be it a new standard or a standard of rational basis variety), it 
is certainly a massive step away from the strict scrutiny standard 
provided in Roe, and casts a great deal of ambiguity into the 
jurisprudence that had previously governed both the Substantive Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to seek an 
abortion. 
1. The Fallout of Casey 
The holding in Casey opened the doors to an onslaught of TRAP 
laws enacted by state legislators claiming to protect the interests of 
women’s health and safety.  In actuality, those laws only placed 
 
156.  18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3204–08 (1990); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 843. 
157.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 873. 
158.  Id. at 874. 
159.  Id. at 875. 
160.  Id. at 844 (“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”). 
161.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. 
Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274). 
162.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2321–23 (2016) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
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obstacles in the paths of women seeking a safe and legal abortion.163  No 
longer protected by the strict scrutiny that Roe required during the first 
trimester, abortion providers across the country were now faced with 
zoning requirements that no other medical professionals had to comply 
with.  For example, abortion clinics had to comply with ambulatory 
surgical center provisions, forcing abortion clinics to purchase expensive 
equipment that they had no use for, or face sudden unemployment.164 
The fallout of Casey was immense and immediate.  The “abortion 
desert” that stretches from the Southeast to the Midwest of the United 
States165 grew impossibly larger after the passage of Casey and the 
undue burden standard.166  As the Court only struck down the spousal 
notification requirement of Pennsylvania’s statute,167 every other 
provision in the statute was ruled constitutional under the Court’s 
newfound “undue burden” standard.168  This deference to the 
Pennsylvania legislature did not go unnoticed by the rest of the 
country.169  Indeed, many states began passing TRAP laws modeled after 
Pennsylvania’s provisions, casting the nature of abortion access into an 
abyss of darkness and confusion.170  This casts the nature of abortion 
access as a fundamental right into some amount of darkness and 
confusion.171 
The sheer amount of deference given to legislatures across the 
country by the Court did not only go unnoticed, but was welcomed, 
 
163.  Martin, supra note 143; see also Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
(Pretty Much) Settled the Abortion Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1336 (2009) [hereinafter 
Abortion Wars]. 
164.  See Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, REWIRE NEWS (Mar. 19, 2016), 
https://rewire.news/legislative-tracker/law-topic/targeted-regulation-of-abortion-providers 
[https://perma.cc/2NJV-GXP5]. 
165.  Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Crossing the ‘Abortion Desert’: Women Increasingly 
Travel Out of Their States for the Procedure, L.A. TIMES (June 2, 2016, 3:30 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-adv-abortion-traveler-20160530-snap-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/JDW3-XK5W]. 
166.  Martin, supra note 143. 
167.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893–95 (1992). 
168.  Id. at 899–901. 
169.  Pro-life organizations quickly realized that while Roe was intact, Casey allowed 
for the easier passage of TRAP laws.  See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The 
Difference a Whole Woman Makes: Protection for the Abortion Right After Whole Woman’s 
Health, 126 YALE L.J. F. 149, 152 (2016) [hereinafter Difference] (“[Americans United For 
Life]’s recent past-President, Charmaine Yoest, was frank in describing AUL’s state 
legislative strategy: ‘As we’re moving forward at the state level, we end up hollowing out 
Roe, even without the Supreme Court.’”) (citation omitted). 
170.  Abortion Wars, supra note 163, at 1336. 
171.  See Martin, supra note 143. 
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particularly in the more conservative states where abortion access was 
already a bleak picture.172  The effect of these TRAP laws, even post-
Whole Woman’s Health, remains devastating, leaving some women with 
only a single abortion clinic in the entire state.173 
Ultimately, the Court had left the country, prior to Whole Woman’s 
Health,174 with a large swath of jurisprudence that seemed to leave 
abortion rights largely unprotected.175  The “undue burden” standard 
does not fit neatly within any category previously discussed by the 
Supreme Court in regard to the Substantive Due Process Clause.  
Arguably, it is something more than a rational basis standard of review, 
but it is far too deferential to the legislature to be considered 
intermediate or strict scrutiny, and in most instances, seems to fail the 
“rational basis with bite” approach.176 
This cloudiness surrounding the “undue burden” standard has led to 
many clashes of thought within the court system, allowing for 
legislatures to make the argument that any state interest (ranging from 
protecting women’s health to the potentiality of life) is justifiable against 
the undue burden it places upon a woman’s right to seek and obtain an 
abortion.177  This bizarre test has led to the closure of hundreds of 
abortion clinics across the United States, particularly in the southern 
region of the country where conservative values run deep.178 
 
172.  See Abby Johnston, The Number of Abortion Clinics in the United States Gets 
Lower Every Single Year, BUSTLE (Jan. 2, 2015), https://www.bustle.com/articles/56149-the-
number-of-abortion-clinics-in-the-united-states-gets-lower-every-single-year 
[https://perma.cc/P4QD-LGH6]. 
173.  Seven states have only one abortion clinic within their jurisdiction.  See Allison 
McCann, The Last Clinics, VICE (May 23, 2017), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/paz4bv/
last-clinics-seven-states-one-abortion-clinic-left [https://perma.cc/72X6-7QD3].  These states 
are Kentucky, West Virginia, Missouri, Wyoming, South Dakota, North Dakota, and 
Mississippi.  Id.  An eighth state, Arkansas, only has one abortion clinic that can perform both 
surgical and medicinal abortions.  Id. 
174.  See generally Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) 
(striking down two Texan TRAP laws as unconstitutional). 
175.  See Clinic Closings, supra note 154, at 1436. 
176.  See Freeman, supra note 40, at 292–94. 
177.  While the “potentiality of life” was discussed in Roe as a legitimate state interest, 
anti-abortion legislatures have shifted their language from the “potentiality of life” to 
“protecting women’s health” in order to guise their true intentions when creating TRAP 
laws—to close abortion clinics.  See Clinic Closings, supra note 154, at 1430. 
178.  In some states, prior to Whole Woman’s Health, the only reason why TRAP laws 
failed was because it would have closed the only abortion clinic in the state—causing an 
undue burden upon women in that specific state.  See Daniel J. Glass, Not in My Hospital: The 
Future of State Statutes Requiring Abortion Providers to Maintain Admitting Privileges at 
Local Hospitals, 49 AKRON L. REV. 249, 270–72 (2016). 
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C. The Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003: Stenberg and Gonzales 
The manner in which the Supreme Court applied Casey only grew 
grimmer with the Court’s holding in Gonzales v. Carhart, a decision that 
upheld a federal partial-birth abortion ban.179  The decision sent the 
message to abortion rights activists across the country that abortion 
remains different.180  However, in deciding Gonzales, the Court 
counteracted its own reproductive autonomy jurisprudence in order to 
craft a different standard by which to judge abortion.181 
Just seven years before their decision in Gonzales, the Court struck 
down a Nebraska partial-birth abortion ban as a violation of Casey’s 
undue burden standard.182  In Stenberg v. Carhart, the statute at issue 
had no exception for medical emergencies or risk to the mother’s health 
and prevented a woman’s right to choose a “dilation and extraction” 
(D&E)183 or “dilation and excavation” (D&X) as abortion methods.184  
Both of these restrictions created an undue burden.185 
In Stenberg, the Court references numerous pieces of evidence 
submitted by medical professionals in support of Dr. Carhart’s usage of 
the D&E procedure, which the district court below relied on when 
making its determination that the D&E ban was a violation of the 
Constitution.186  Nebraska’s argument was that a health exception187 was 
 
179.  See generally, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).  For a more nuanced 
discussion of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 and the problematic nature of 
banning late-term abortion, see generally Tamara F. Kushnir, Comment, It’s My Body, It’s My 
Choice: The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1117 (2004). 
180.  See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 170–71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
Today’s decision is alarming.  It refuses to take Casey and Stenberg seriously.  It 
tolerates, indeed applauds, federal intervention to ban nationwide a procedure 
found necessary and proper in certain cases by the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG).  It blurs the line, firmly drawn in 
Casey, between previability and postviability abortions.  And, for the first time 
since Roe, the Court blesses a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a 
woman’s health. 
Id. 
181.  See id. at 170 (comparing the outcome in Gonzales with Stenberg). 
182.  See generally Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
183.  For an explanation of a D&E procedure (the most commonly used method of post-
first trimester abortion), see id. at 923–27 (2000). 
184.  For an explanation of a D&X procedure, see id. at 927–29. 
185.  Id. at 938. 
186.  Id. at 928–30. 
187.  Both Roe and Casey require an exception for all abortion procedures to allow the 
procedure if the life or health of the woman is in jeopardy, regardless of how far along she is 
into the pregnancy.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992). 
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not necessary; they relied only on their belief that the evidence provided 
at the district court was incorrect, and thus failed to meet their burden.188  
Stenberg, in expressing the fact that abortion regulations must have a 
health exception for the mother, regardless of the viability of the fetus, 
had two important effects.  It was a small step forward in terms of 
protecting abortion access, and a step toward a true rational basis 
standard when the Court rejected all of Nebraska’s reasons for not 
having a health exception as insufficient on their face.189  However, 
Stenberg still dances around the notion that a state’s supposed legitimate 
interest in requiring a doctor to perform any procedure other than the 
procedure that a doctor believes is best for his or her own patient may be 
unconstitutional on its face.190 
What made Gonzales different, according to the Court?  The answer 
lies in the originator of the legislation: is the Court monitoring the fact-
finding of a state when determining whether or not pseudoscience is 
being used in determining abortion legislation, or is the Court examining 
the fact-finding of the federal Congress doing precisely the same 
thing?191 
In 2003, Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act192 in 
direct response to Stenberg.193  Along with the passage of this law came 
 
188.  See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 931–32. 
189.  See id. at 937–38. 
190.  See id. at 946–47 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
191.  Indeed, the Supreme Court was willing to strike down Nebraska’s presented 
evidence rife with pseudoscience that ran contrary to medical evidence, but would not do the 
same with the federal Congress.  See id. at 931–32 (rejecting State arguments against medical 
evidence provided by Carhart); cf. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 175–76 (2007) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pointing out the Court’s acceptance of pseudoscience in upholding 
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act). 
192.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2016). 
193.  Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 141.  After Stenberg, Congress took great issue with the 
Court’s determination that “D&X” and “D&E” abortions were considered medically safe and 
passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act.  Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 108 Pub. 
L. No. 105, 117 Stat. 1201.  The Congressional record in the passage of the bill is rife with 
discussion concerning the evidence the Court discussed in Stenberg, and the rejection of 
evidence presented by Nebraska at trial, particularly regarding the health and safety of the 
type of abortion Dr. Carhart performs. 
However, the great weight of evidence presented at the Stenberg trial and other 
trials challenging partial-birth abortion bans, as well as at extensive Congressional 
hearings, demonstrates that a partial-birth abortion is never necessary to preserve 
the health of a woman, poses significant health risks to a woman upon whom the 
procedure is performed, and is outside of the standard of medical care. 
PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION BAN ACT OF 2003, 149 CONG. REC. H4922, 4922 (daily ed. June 
4, 2003). 
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factual findings challenging the findings of the safety of D&E and D&X 
in Stenberg.194  Ultimately, the Court determined that the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Act was neither vague nor unconstitutional on its face, and it 
did not pose an undue burden due to overbreadth.195  For the purposes of 
undue burden, the Court determined that because the Act did not prohibit 
all forms of D&E, it did not violate the Casey standard.196  While 
Nebraska’s statute prohibited all forms of D&E, the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Act only bans intact D&E, thus differentiating the Act from the 
Nebraska statute.197  Further, evidence offered by abortion providers who 
perform D&E on a daily basis was summarily rejected by the Court as 
being inadequate to prove the Act negatively impacted abortion 
providers who utilize the procedure.198  Even more incredibly, the Court 
did not allow for a health and safety exception with the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act, in direct contrast with previous abortion 
jurisprudence.199 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Gonzales also points to the prevalence 
of pseudoscience within the Congressional findings that led to the 
Partial-Birth Abortion Act, factual findings on which the majority 
opinion in Gonzales relied.200  As the Supreme Court is bound to the 
findings of the court below,201 the carte blanche nature of the “undue 
burden” standard, and the avoidance of the Court to utilize the full 
weight of the Substantive Due Process Clause when examining 
reproductive justice, is once again exposed.202  How legitimate is a state 
interest that relies on faulty, often false, medical evidence which could 
potentially lead to the criminal prosecution of both medical professionals 
and women?203 
The utilization of pseudoscience in order to make a state interest 
 
194.  Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 141. 
195.  Id. at 147. 
196.  Id. at 150. 
197.  Id. at 150–52. 
198.  Id. at 154. 
199.  Id. at 170–71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
200.  See id. at 175–76. 
201.  See id. at 174–75. 
202.  See Clinic Closings, supra note 154, at 1447 (discussing the distinction between 
the application of the “undue burden” standard depending on what TRAP law is before 
different circuit courts). 
203.  See Nicholas J. Little, Meet Vincent Rue, the Man Behind the Pseudoscience of 
Abortion Restrictions, SALON (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.salon.com/2016/03/02/
meet_vincent_rue_the_man_behind_the_pseudoscience_of_abortion_restrictions/ 
[https://perma.cc/SB9D-7UUD]. 
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appear “legitimate” alone is enough material for an entirely separate 
Note topic.  However, the utilization of false medical evidence rears its 
head in a large majority of TRAP law cases—including Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt, the Court’s most recent abortion decision.204  The 
Court’s previous reliance on legislative evidence, and its avoidance of 
affording abortion and reproductive justice the full protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, came to a head with a return to a Texan statute 
which negatively impacted millions of women across the state.205 
III. THE ROAD TO WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt began in a dramatic fashion, 
with an eleven-hour filibuster by a State Senator wearing bright pink 
sneakers and a back brace.206  The scene within the Texas Capitol during 
the passage of the controversial statute that became the main character in 
Whole Woman’s Health portrayed an accurate depiction of where 
abortion access stood across the country: women in the balconies 
screaming “let her speak” in support of the filibuster initiated by State 
Senator Wendy Davis, as the mostly male electorate attempted to pass 
the bill regardless of time having run out.207  Eventually, the bill was 
passed, and abortion providers in Texas immediately sought an 
injunction.208  This set the stage for a re-examination of Casey and, as 
this Note will argue, a clarification of a muddied standard. 
 
204.  While “pseudoscience” is not specifically mentioned within the opinion of Whole 
Woman’s Health, Justice Breyer is extraordinarily pointed in his declaration that Texas did not 
provide any evidence to support their claims of promoting the health and welfare of Texan 
women when enacting the statutes at hand in the case.  See Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016). 
205.  See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a) (2015) (requiring doctors 
that work at abortion clinics to have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals); TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(a) (2015) (requiring abortion clinics to comply with the same 
standards as ambulatory surgical centers, regardless of whether abortion clinics perform on-
site surgical abortions). 
206.  See Amanda Marcotte, What the Hell Happened in Texas Last Night?, SLATE 
(June 26, 2013, 10:02 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2013/06/26/
wendy_davis_and_pro_choice_protesters_win_the_night_in_texas.html [https://perma.cc/
JT3R-NJEL]. 
207.  For a video recording of the final five minutes of Senator Davis’s eleven-hour 
filibuster of the omnibus bill at discussion in this Note, see The Texas Tribune, Final 
Moments of Filibuster, YOUTUBE (June 27, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
NlEHJNTQeRs. 
208.  Laura Bassett, Texas Sued Over Abortion Law Wendy Davis Tried to Block, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/27/texas-
abortion-lawsuit_n_4002869.html [https://perma.cc/6KQR-MTLK]. 
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A. Showdown in Texas: Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt 
In 2013, the Texas legislature introduced a piece of legislation 
labeled House Bill 2 (H.B. 2).209  Though H.B. 2 included numerous 
anti-abortion provisions, the two most controversial (and arguably most 
devastating) required doctors who worked at abortion clinics to have 
admitting privileges,210 and required that abortion clinics comply with 
the same standards as an ambulatory surgical center.211  While, facially, 
these two provisions seem to be on-board with what is considered 
constitutional under Casey, the effects of H.B. 2 quickly became 
apparent soon after the bill was put into effect.212 
In 2012, there were over forty abortion clinics in Texas; after H.B. 2 
took effect, the number dropped by roughly half.213  Immediately 
following the passage of H.B. 2, a group of abortion providers (including 
the named Plaintiff, Whole Woman’s Health) sought an injunction from 
the district court, in addition to a declaratory judgment that H.B. 2 was 
 
209.  The Supreme Court, when deciding Whole Woman’s Health, considered two 
Texan statutes.  Colloquially, the two statutes have come to be known by the house bill by 
which they were introduced and will be known throughout this Note as “H.B. 2.”  Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2296 (2016). 
210.  TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a)(1) (Oct. 29, 2013).  
Admitting privileges require that a doctor essentially be a staff member of a hospital, able to 
admit patients into that specific hospital for an overnight stay.  Paul Waldman, The ‘Admitting 
Privileges’ Sham, and the Future of Abortion in America, WEEK (June 11, 2015), 
http://theweek.com/articles/559840/admitting-privileges-sham-future-abortion-america 
[https://perma.cc/NZZ7-G7WF].  For abortion providers, obtaining these privileges are not 
only an additional hurdle to practice, but often impossible in certain states.  See id. 
211.  TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(a) (Apr. 2, 2015).  Ambulatory 
surgical center requirements force abortion clinics to purchase equipment that may not be 
needed in order to safely perform abortions.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2302–03.  
Additionally, H.B. 2 allowed actual ambulatory surgical centers to waive the requirements but 
did not allow such waivers for abortion clinics.  Id. 
212.  New Research Reveals Devastating Impact of Clinic Shutdown Laws on Texas 
Women, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.reproductiverights.org/press-
room/new-research-reveals-devastating-impact-of-clinic-shutdown-laws-on-texas-women 
[https://perma.cc/6E2F-LJ9U]. 
213.  The numbers of how many clinics remained in Texas after H.B. 2’s passage are in 
dispute.  Generally speaking, the agreed statistic is about half of Texas’ abortion clinics were 
closed due to the legislation.  See Alexa Ura, et. al., Here Are the Texas Abortion Clinics That 
Have Closed Since 2013, TEXAS TRIBUNE (June 28, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2016/06/28/texas-abortion-clinics-have-closed-hb2-passed-
2013/ [https://perma.cc/NLJ9-NSER].  The Supreme Court cites the numbers as “over forty” 
clinics existed prior to H.B. 2 and the “number dropped by almost half leading up to and in the 
wake of enforcement of the admitting-privileges requirement that went into effect in late-
October 2013.”  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2301 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health 
v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 681 (W.D. Tex. 2014)). 
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unconstitutional and a violation of the undue burden standard.214  The 
injunction was granted and H.B. 2 was declared unconstitutional by the 
district court.215 
The Fifth Circuit, however, vacated the district court’s injunction.216  
Stating that the district court had misinterpreted the Casey standard and 
erred on the merits, the Fifth Circuit found Texas’ legitimate state 
interest of regulating abortion clinics for the safety and wellbeing of 
women to be adequate.  The Fifth Circuit’s decision did not require 
Texas to provide evidence that H.B.2 actually addressed the safety and 
wellbeing of women.217  The Fifth Circuit’s refusal to examine the 
evidence offered by Whole Woman’s Health as to the effect of H.B. 2218 
unveiled a problem within the undue burden standard: if a state is 
allowed a blank check to regulate abortion, what is available to review 
their powers on regulating abortion?  How legitimate is a state interest 
when the interest is so vague as protecting the welfare of women?219 
The crux of Whole Woman’s Health is, ultimately, the legitimacy of 
Texas’ state interest.  Further, the unasked question of Whole Woman’s 
Health was whether a state could continue to offer the health and safety 
of women as a legitimate state interest without offering proof established 
upon actual medical evidence.220  The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of 
Casey allowed for the possibility that Texas, simply by stating that the 
intention of the legislation was to protect women’s health, had fulfilled 
their burden of the undue burden test.221  Whole Woman’s Health pointed 
to the very problem the Casey standard allowed: the unfettered 
allowance of TRAP laws that have nothing to do with protecting 
women’s health and everything to do with blocking access to a 
procedure that was guaranteed as a fundamental right in 1973.222 
 
214.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2301. 
215.  Id. at 2303. 
216.  Id. 
217.  Id. at 2303–04. 
218.  Incredibly, the Fifth Circuit stated that Texan “women in El Paso wishing to have 
an abortion could use abortion providers in nearby New Mexico” to alleviate their undue 
burden of not having an available abortion clinic within their own state.  Id. at 2304. 
219.  Texas repeatedly stated, both within the record and at oral argument, that Texas’ 
main objective with H.B. 2 was to protect the safety and welfare of women.  Transcript of 
Oral Argument, supra note 161, at 52–53. 
220.  See Brief for Petitioners at 12–14, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 135 S. 
Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274). 
221.  See id. at 32–34. 
222.  See Difference, supra note 169, at 151. 
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B.  The Burden Is Undue: Whole Woman’s Health Decided 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court (in a 5-3 decision, following the 
death of Justice Scalia) ruled in favor of Whole Woman’s Health, 
determining that H.B. 2 had violated the Substantive Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Casey standard.223  Justice Breyer, 
writing for the majority, cited the evidence within the record that the 
district court examined, stating that the findings the district court made 
based on the record were not clearly erroneous.224  Further, the Court 
held that the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Casey was incorrect.225  The 
Fifth Circuit stated that a state law is “constitutional if: (1) it does not 
have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of 
a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus; and (2) it is 
reasonably related to (or designed to further) a legitimate state 
interest.”226  In other words, the Fifth Circuit required Whole Woman’s 
Health to show intent of obstruction to the right of abortion, rather than 
the disparate impact, of H.B. 2. 
The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of H.B. 2 is problematic for 
numerous reasons.  Mainly, if a court required every abortion provider or 
woman to prove that the state legislature’s intent behind every TRAP 
law was to dismantle the abortion clinic infrastructure, no case would 
proceed forward.227  H.B. 2 was deliberately worded to target abortion 
clinics directly, but under the guise of protecting women’s health and 
welfare.228  Had Whole Woman’s Health been required to prove the 
malicious intent of the Texan legislature, they almost certainly would 
have lost.229 
 
223.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320. 
224.  Id. at 2316. 
225.  Id. at 2309. 
226.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 572 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d, Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
227.  The undue burden standard requires that a state not pose a burden upon a woman’s 
right to seek an abortion, indicating that a state could not pass a statute with the intent of 
creating obstacles in a woman’s path.  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 
(1992).  This is, as has been discussed, uncomfortably vague.  See supra Subpart II.B.  This 
was particularly apparent in Gonzales v. Carhart, where Justice Ginsburg commented upon 
the inaccuracies of pseudoscience relied upon by Congress in passing the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Act, which the Supreme Court ignored in favor of taking Congress’ word that the 
statute was passed to protect both women and the potentiality of life.  Gonzales v. Carhart, 
550 U.S. 124, 174–77 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
228.  See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (explaining the two provisions of 
H.B. 2 that were under scrutiny within the case). 
229.  While the Court did not take evidence into account when determining Casey, 
Justice Breyer soundly rejected Texas’ stated intention in Whole Woman’s Health, as the state  
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Instead, Justice Breyer emphasized the importance of the district 
court’s consideration of “the existence or nonexistence of medical 
benefits” when examining an abortion regulation.230  Additionally, 
Justice Breyer voiced concern for the number of clinics that were closed 
as a result of H.B. 2.231  Even if a few abortion clinics coincidentally 
closed around the time H.B. 2 was enacted for unrelated reasons, 
“common sense” dictates that the majority of these closures were 
because of the stringent requirements placed upon abortion clinics by 
H.B. 2, and that the closures would place an insurmountable burden 
upon the abortion clinics that managed to escape H.B. 2 regulations.232 
The decision in Whole Woman’s Health opened the door to the 
acceptance of an established constitutional standard by which to protect 
abortion providers and abortion access.233  Whole Woman’s Health also 
established the need for the state to prove that their legislation has a 
legitimate purpose.234  Texas, when asked at oral argument, could not 
provide a single instance of a Texan woman who had been adversely 
affected by the existing abortion regulations in place.235  Indeed, Texas 
could only point to an instance in Pennsylvania where abortion 
regulations were inadequate to prevent a tragedy.236  That specific 
instance, the majority points out, was exceptionally horrific and, 
therefore, rare—and even if that scandal was a common occurrence, 
 
did not provide evidence supporting their intention.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 912–26 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (discussing the absence of 
evidence that the Pennsylvanian statute met the goals of the state in protecting women’s 
health); cf. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (commenting upon the absence of 
evidence in Texas’ argument and stating it as a reason for the invalidity of the statute). 
230.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309. 
231.  See id. at 2301–03. 
232.  Id. at 2317. 
233.  See Dennis Pathroff, Comment, Abortion and Birth Control—United States 
Supreme Court Declares Texas’ Restrictions on Abortion Facilities Unconstitutional: Impact 
on States with Similar Abortion Restrictions, 92 N.D. L. REV. 213, 228–29 (2016). 
234.  See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309. 
235.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 161, at 47–49. 
236.  Texas was one of many states that passed stricter abortion regulations after the 
Kermit Gosnell Scandal, which concerned an abortion doctor in Pennsylvania who was 
convicted of murder.  See Jon Hurdle & Trip Gabriel, Philadelphia Abortion Doctor Guilty of 
Murder in Late-Term Procedures, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/05/14/us/kermit-gosnell-abortion-doctor-found-guilty-of-murder.html.  The details of the 
case are exceptionally gruesome and were seen as a rallying cry for anti-abortion activists to 
ban the procedure altogether, even though the atrocities that Dr. Gosnell committed were 
considered anything but abortion.  See id.  Texas, by their own admission, states that H.B. 2 
was in reaction to said scandal in Pennsylvania.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 161, 
at 63–64. 
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Texas had been avoiding these atrocities before H.B. 2 without 
unnecessary additional regulations.237 
This rejection of hysteria and pseudoscience is reinforced by Justice 
Ginsburg’s two-page concurrence, which flatly labels H.B. 2 as a TRAP 
law and sends a clear message to legislatures about their TRAP laws: 
they likely will not survive judicial review under Casey and Roe.238  This 
resounding rejection of unnecessary restrictions, while not the 
commanding opinion, sends a clear message to the lower courts that 
decorative language draping around oppressive legislation is not enough 
to meet the Casey burden.239  If anything, the Court in Whole Woman’s 
Health chose to utilize the Casey standard to protect, rather than defer.240 
However clear-cut Whole Woman’s Health is on its face, it is not 
without criticism; the dissenting opinions in Whole Woman’s Health, 
much like the dissents in Lawrence, echo protestations that the majority 
exceeded the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment.241  Justices Thomas 
and Alito both penned separate dissenting opinions, each focusing on a 
different area of the law that they felt the majority had violated in 
striking down H.B. 2.242  Justice Thomas, having been a vocal opponent 
of the Court’s abortion jurisprudence since Casey,243 accused the 
majority of scrapping the old standard in favor of something stronger 
without any precedent.244  Justice Alito interpreted the statistics and 
 
237.  Justice Breyer, when inquiring about the Gosnell Scandal’s place in Texas’ legal 
argument, quite plainly asked: “So what is the benefit to the woman of a procedure that is 
going to cure a problem of which there is not one single instance in the nation, though perhaps 
there is one, but not in Texas.”  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 161, at 48. 
238.  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
239.  Id. (“Given [the safety of abortion as a medical procedure], it is beyond rational 
belief that H.B. 2 could genuinely protect the health of women, and certain that the law 
‘would simply make it more difficult for them to obtain abortions.’”) (quoting Planned 
Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2015)). 
240.  Whole Woman’s Health places a higher burden upon the state in order to restrict 
and regulate abortion, rather than deferring to the state’s purported expertise concerning the 
medical procedure.  See id. at 2326 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“And the majority seriously 
burdens States, which must guess at how much more compelling their interests must be to pass 
muster and what ‘commonsense inferences’ of an undue burden this Court will identify 
next.”). 
241.  See id. at 2326–27; cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
242.  See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2321 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the difference between Casey and Whole Woman’s Health); see also id. at 2342–
43 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing the majority’s reliance on inference, rather than hard fact, 
in regard to abortion clinic closures in Texas). 
243.  Id. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
244.  Id. at 2321. 
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evidence provided in the record as not being an undue burden, claiming 
that the majority wrongly utilized inference without concrete conclusions 
as to why so many abortion clinics closed.245  Justice Thomas also 
voiced his opinion that Roe v. Wade is based on faulty law,246 and as 
previously discussed in this Note, Justice Thomas is not necessarily 
wrong.247 
In examining the dissenting opinions of Whole Woman’s Health and 
the supposed emergence of a new standard of review, one must look at 
Substantive Due Process jurisprudence as a whole.248  With previous 
reproductive justice cases, the Court’s avoidance of using the 
Substantive Due Process Clause during the Lochner era caused a rift in 
jurisprudence that allowed for claims of judicial intervention and 
activism.249  Whole Woman’s Health utilized the full weight of the 
rational basis standard, unlike its predecessors, and can be fairly and 
equitably compared with the previously discussed cases.250 
IV. “UNDUE BURDEN WITH TEETH”: A NEW STANDARD EMERGES 
The determination that Whole Woman’s Health posits a stronger 
standard by which to assess abortion regulations is not a novel 
conclusion.251  However, this Note argues that Whole Woman’s Health 
strengthens the Casey standard into something resembling “undue 
burden with teeth” and returns abortion to established Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence in regard to (strengthened) rational basis 
scrutiny.  As will be discussed, the Supreme Court’s determination was 
not solely based on the burden that the statute placed upon women 
seeking an abortion, but the benefit such statutes had for the citizens who 
 
245.  The majority of Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion focuses upon the res judicata 
issue within Whole Woman’s Health, which is not at issue in this Note.  See id. at 2342–43 
(Alito, J., dissenting).  However, Justice Alito also comments upon the majority’s reliance 
upon inference, rather than established fact, that the ambulatory surgical center requirement 
forced abortion clinics to close.  See id. 
246.  See id. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  “I remain fundamentally opposed to the 
Court’s abortion jurisprudence.”  Id. 
247.  See supra Section I.B.2 (exploring contraception); cf. supra Subpart II.A 
(examining Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); supra Subpart II.B (examining Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). 
248.  See supra Part I (discussing the Substantive Due Process Clause). 
249.  See supra Section I.B.2 (exploring contraception); cf. supra Subpart II.A 
(examining Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); supra Subpart II.B (examining Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). 
250.  See supra Part I (discussing Substantive Due Process jurisprudence); cf. infra Part 
IV (exploring the new Whole Woman’s Health standard). 
251.  See generally Foley, supra note 130. 
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required abortions.252  This standard—as Justice Thomas discusses at 
length in his dissenting opinion—is not only a departure from Casey, but 
is an entirely new standard of review.253 
A. Burdens v. Benefits: Justice Thomas’ Dissent 
The Supreme Court’s decision to utilize evidence that showed 
H.B. 2 was a catastrophe for women’s health and welfare in its 
determination that Texas had violated the Substantive Due Process 
Clause is a massive departure from established Casey jurisprudence.254  
Casey specifically rejects the notion of utilizing the alleged benefits of a 
statute when determining the effect of a statute regulating abortion, only 
speaking to the burden of a statute upon a woman’s right to choose.255  
The notion of Casey’s undue burden standard taking into account the 
effect a statute has upon the women it is supposed to protect is a concept 
that comes from Justice Stevens’ concurrence within Casey—not 
binding law, but nonetheless compelling to the majority in Whole 
Woman’s Health that decided the case.256 
While Justice Thomas and his fellow dissenters vocalized their 
disapproval, they also provided a stronger argument toward the 
realization of a stronger standard for abortion access.257  Indeed, as 
Justice Thomas writes: “Whatever scrutiny the majority applies to 
Texas’ law, it bears little resemblance to the undue-burden test the Court 
articulated in [Casey], and its successors.”258  He is correct; Whole 
Woman’s Health changes the game entirely.  
 
252.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016). 
253.  See id. at 2325 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
254.  Id.; see Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165–66 (2007); cf. Planned Parenthood 
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 888–94 (1992) (showing that the majority of Casey relied 
on record evidence, not medical evidence, to make their determination in regard to the spousal 
notification requirement). 
255.  See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2325 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 901. 
256.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 920 (“A state-imposed burden on the exercise of a 
constitutional right is measured both by its effects and by its character: A burden may be 
‘undue’ either because the burden is too severe or because it lacks a legitimate, rational 
justification.”) (emphasis added).  It is also worth noting that Justice Stevens, along with 
Justice Blackmun (the original author of Roe), voted to uphold Roe’s strict scrutiny standard 
of the 3-2-4 plurality, rather than supplant it with Casey’s undue burden standard.  Id. at 912–
26 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Foley, supra note 130, at 157. 
257.  See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2321 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the difference between Casey’s standard and the standard applied by the majority 
in Whole Woman’s Health). 
258.  Id. (citation omitted). 
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In rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Casey, the Court 
elevated the “undue burden” standard to a true balancing test—one that 
examines the ability of a woman to seek an abortion against a state’s 
legitimate interest in regulating abortion.259  As Justice Thomas points 
out numerous times in his dissent, this is not the standard created in 
Casey by the majority-plurality.260  He, this Note argues, is correct. 
B. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due Process Clause: 
“Undue Burden” Meets “Rational Basis Review” 
The “benefits-and-burdens balancing test”261 is not only a departure 
from Casey, but also from previous Supreme Court jurisprudence 
regarding abortion.262  While the majority in Whole Woman’s Health 
states that the standard used is “undue burden,” it is certainly not a 
stretch of the imagination to see that the language utilized in Whole 
Woman’s Health provides a powerful tool with which to challenge 
TRAP laws.263  Forcing states to provide evidence of their legislative 
intent without hiding behind the sham that is “women’s health and 
welfare” is a massive step away from Casey’s vague deferential standard 
that had no real label.  Whole Woman’s Health, in holding Texas 
accountable for their legislative decisions regarding abortion, sent a loud 
message: legislatures cannot masquerade TRAP laws as protective 
legislation for women; the Supreme Court will not allow it.264 
In examining past Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and 
comparing Whole Woman’s Health with previously utilized balancing 
tests in substantive due process cases, it is evident that the Court has 
finally placed abortion and reproductive justice on the same level of 
importance and protection as the rights protected by what many call 
 
259.  See id. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Finally, even if a law imposes no 
‘substantial obstacle’ to women’s access to abortions, the law now must have more than a 
‘reasonabl[e] relat[ion] to . . . a legitimate state interest.’  These precepts are nowhere to be 
found in Casey or its successors.”) (emphasis added) (alterations in original). 
260.  Id. at 2325 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Of the nine Justices who both heard and 
decided Casey, only two remained on the bench at the time Whole Woman’s Health was 
argued and decided: Justice Kennedy (who was a member of the Casey plurality-majority) and 
Justice Thomas (who dissented in both Casey and Whole Woman’s Health).  Justice Kennedy 
did not write an opinion for Whole Woman’s Health. 
261.  Id. at 2324. 
262.  See generally Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997). 
263.  See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–10. 
264.  See id. at 2320–21 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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“rational basis with bite.”265  Lawrence266 and Obergefell267 rejected the 
states’ reasoning of “morality” for passing anti-LGBTQ-targeted 
discriminatory policies.  Casey, too, emphasized that morality is never 
satisfactory to restrict the rights and liberties of a citizen.268  However, 
while Obergefell and Lawrence utilized a true “rational basis with bite” 
balancing test in order to strike down discriminatory legislation, Casey 
applied an abortion-specific standard that was both vague and far too 
deferential to the legislature.269  The language utilized in Whole 
Woman’s Health and the navigation of the Fourteenth Amendment is far 
more comparable to prior Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and 
Roe, rather than the deferential standard set forth by Casey.270  While the 
majority is careful to label the standard used as “undue burden,” Justice 
Thomas’ point is valid: this is different.271  The question remains, 
though: how are lower courts handling like cases, and has this caused a 
massive amount of confusion like Whole Woman’s Health’s older sister, 
Casey? 
C. Whole Woman’s Health: The Impact 
Since the decision in Whole Woman’s Health, lower courts have 
been striking down TRAP laws of similar quality and impact to H.B. 
2.272  In Alabama, a TRAP law focusing on school zones was struck 
down as unconstitutional under the “undue burden” standard, citing 
Whole Woman’s Health as precedent to examine the benefits of such a 
 
265.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (rejecting Texas’ argument for 
“morality” as a legitimate state interest); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2596–97 (2015) (rejecting the argument for immorality in restricting homosexual couples 
from being married); cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) 
(stating that morality is not a satisfactory state interest while incorporating the “undue burden” 
standard, rather than rational basis). 
266.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582. 
267.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596–97 (discussing the United States’ history of 
considering homosexuality immoral, which the Court rejected as a legitimate state interest in 
outlawing same-sex marriage). 
268.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 850. 
269.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596–97; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582; Casey, 505 
U.S. at 850. 
270.  See supra Parts I–II. 
271.  See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2325–26 (2016) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
272.  See W. Ala. Women’s Ctr. v. Miller, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1347 (M.D. Ala. 
2016); Burns v. Cline, 382 P.3d 1048, 1054–55 (Okla. 2016) (Combs, V.C.J, concurring); 
Capital Care Network of Toledo v. State Dep’t of Health, 58 N.E.3d 1207, 1211 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2016); Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky. v. Comm’r, No. 1:16-cv-00763-TWP-DML, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84917, at *25 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 2016). 
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statute in comparison to the burdens placed upon women seeking an 
abortion.273  In Wisconsin, an admitting privileges requirement similar to 
H.B. 2 was deemed unconstitutional.274  The Court denied certiorari on 
appeal275 after deciding Whole Woman’s Health.276  Virginia scrapped 
ambulatory surgical center requirements for abortion clinics, citing 
Whole Woman’s Health as the reasoning to be rid of its TRAP laws.277  
The Court also denied certiorari to Mississippi’s appeal of a similarly 
struck TRAP law.278  More TRAP laws have been struck down in 
Oklahoma,279 Ohio,280 and Indiana.281  The impact of Whole Woman’s 
Health has been felt the most, perhaps, by the named plaintiff of the 
case: post-victory, Whole Woman’s Health successfully won another 
lawsuit against the state of Texas utilizing Whole Woman’s Health as an 
argument against a new TRAP law imposing specific conditions upon 
second-term abortions.282 
 
273.  See W. Ala. Women’s Ctr., 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1347 (striking down an Alabama 
school zoning ordinance that would have shut down numerous clinics). 
274.  While Schimel was decided before Whole Woman’s Health, the Seventh Circuit 
utilized language strikingly similar to the majority opinion.  See Planned Parenthood of Wis., 
Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 916 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Until and unless Roe v. Wade is overruled 
by the Supreme Court, a statute likely to restrict access to abortion with no offsetting medical 
benefit cannot be held to be within the enacting state’s constitutional authority.”) (emphasis 
added).  The Supreme Court denied Wisconsin’s petition for writ of certiorari after Whole 
Woman’s Health was announced.  Schimel v. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 
2545, 2545 (2016). 
275.  See Schimel, 136 S. Ct. at 2545. 
276.  Molly Beck, U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Wisconsin’s Appeal of Abortion 
Restrictions Ruling, WIS. ST. J. (June 29, 2016), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-
and-politics/u-s-supreme-court-rejects-wisconsin-s-appeal-of-abortion/article_ab0f94fd-aef7-
5d89-9d7c-a61333857460.html [https://perma.cc/5G56-FBR6]. 
277.  See Laura Vozzella, Virginia Rolls Back Restrictions on Abortion Clinics, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-rolls-
back-restrictions-on-abortion-clinics/2016/10/24/9f3fb3e8-99fd-11e6-9980-
50913d68eacb_story.html [https://perma.cc/5KMD-CXAG]. 
278.  See Jess Bravin & Louise Radnofsky, Supreme Court Denies Mississippi, 
Wisconsin Efforts to Reinstate Abortion Laws, WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-denies-mississippi-wisconsin-efforts-to-reinstate-
abortion-laws-1467124416. 
279.  See Burns v. Cline, 382 P.3d 1048, 1051–53 (Okla. 2016). 
280.  See Capital Care Network of Toledo v. State Dep’t of Health, 58 N.E.3d 1207, 
1211 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016), rev’d, 2018-Ohio-440 (2018). 
281.  See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky. v. Comm’r, 194 F. Supp. 3d 818, 830 (S.D. 
Ind. 2016). 
282.  The district court analyzed the new Texan TRAP law with a benefits-and-burdens 
analysis, as this Note argues.  See Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, No. A-17-CV-690-LY, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195268, at *35 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2017) (“Indeed, the court finds 
the Act’s burdens, by definition, exceed its benefits, those burdens are undue, and the  
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Overall, Whole Woman’s Health (thus far) has provided clarification 
of a vague standard and protected abortion access, rather than grant new 
deference to the legislature.  The future of abortion access is, by and 
large, not secure in the least.283  Some jurisdictions are reluctant to 
expand the right to access underneath the proposed new standard.  The 
Eighth Circuit, for example, stated that an admitting privileges 
requirement (albeit a requirement that differs from H.B. 2) promulgated 
by the state of Arkansas was constitutional.284  This decision, however, is 
an outlier—the majority of decisions post-Whole Woman’s Health, as 
discussed above, have been favorable to a woman’s right to choose. 
The rights of abortion access have typically hung in the hands of the 
legislature and have remained dependent upon a base that will protect 
them rather than strike them down.  However, Whole Woman’s Health 
has produced a new tool by which to remove total deference to the 
legislature that will, hopefully, exist for some time to come. 
CONCLUSION 
The standards applied to the Fourteenth Amendment have an 
extraordinary amount of variation depending on which fundamental right 
the Supreme Court is examining.285  However, the Fourteenth 
Amendment has recently begun to take the shape of the amorphous 
“rational basis with bite” standard.286  This is where Whole Woman’s 
Health falls into place and abortion joins the rest of the fundamental 
rights and liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Substantive Due Process Clause.287  
 
obstacles they embody are, by definition, substantial.”). 
283.  Recently, The United States went from a pro-choice to a pro-life executive office, 
thereby shifting the balance of power—and, potentially, the fate of abortion access.  See Beth 
Reinhard, Donald Trump’s Victory Looks Set to Renew Battle Over Abortion Rights, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 20, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trumps-victory-looks-set-to-
renew-battle-over-abortion-rights-1479671454. 
284.  The law requires a physician who wished to administer medicinal abortions to 
have a contract with another physician who has admitting privileges.  See ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 20-16-1504 (2016).  To reach this decision, the Eighth Circuit determined that “the district 
court was required to make a finding that the Act’s contract-physician requirement is an undue 
burden for a large fraction of women seeking medication abortions in Arkansas.”  Planned 
Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. v. Jegley, 864 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir. 2017).  The district court 
erred in its discretion, as the Eighth Circuit points out that there was no numerical evidence of 
how many women would be affected by the law, in contrast to Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt.  Id. 
285.  See supra Part I; cf. supra Part II. 
286.  See Pettinga, supra note 41, at 780; supra Subpart I.B. 
287.  See supra Part I; cf. supra Part III. 
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The “undue burden” standard has wrought more harm than good 
upon abortion access within the United States by creating uncertainty in 
substantive due process jurisprudence.288  It is “abortion-specific,”289 
crafted specifically to deal with abortion regulations passed by 
legislatures that, more often than not, did more harm than good.290  
Abortion, a fundamental right, is the proverbial black sheep of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Clause family; Whole 
Woman’s Health does not change that fact.  What has changed with 
Whole Woman’s Health is the emergence of “undue burden with 
teeth”—placing abortion (and, with it, reproductive justice) into the 
same tier as sexual orientation, sexual conduct, and other protected 
fundamental rights.291  With Whole Woman’s Health, TRAP laws can no 
longer hide behind the guise of a vague standard.  Now, they are subject 
to a more searching scrutiny of the facts giving rise to the legislation, 
and abortion access can finally begin to rebuild what was lost for over 
twenty years. 
The potential of Whole Woman’s Health is vast, but the actuality of 
the impact of this newfound standard will be determined as legal 
scholars examine the full impact of the decision in the years to come.  
However, the immediate signs are positive for abortion access.  While 
the impact of TRAP laws will take years to overcome, the future looks 
marginally brighter for abortion access underneath Whole Woman’s 
Health, rather than Casey. 
 
288.  See Thomas J. Molony, Fulfilling the Promise of Roe: A Pathway for Meaningful 
Pre-Abortion Consultation, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 713, 713 (2016). 
289.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2321 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
290.  See State Policies on Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/
united-states/abortion/state-policies-abortion [https://perma.cc/YD8L-QKK2] (citing that 288 
abortion restrictions were adopted from 2011–2015). 
291.  See supra Section I.B.4 (discussing Obergefell). 
